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THE LOPSIDED HARMS OF REPRODUCTIVE NEGLIGENCE 
Carol Sanger* 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of reproductive negligence is probably not unfamiliar 
to men and women of child-bearing or child-begetting age. Many a rest-
less hour has been spent worrying about the consequences of a skipped 
pill, an abandoned condom, or some other form of contraceptive 
carelessness. The general rule in such circumstances is that the injured 
party has no recourse in tort against a sexual partner whose negligence 
resulted, say, in a pregnancy. (Interestingly, liability may arise as the 
result of the negligent transmission of herpes.1) To be sure, not all repro-
ductive misconduct is negligent; some is intentional, as when a sexual 
partner tampers with his partner’s birth control or lies about the use of 
contraception. But here, too, no liability attaches for the harm of an 
unwanted pregnancy.2 As the New York Court of Appeals reminded a 
male respondent seeking to avoid a child support order, “[T]he 
mother’s conduct [misrepresenting her use of birth control] in no way 
limited his right to use contraception.”3 Assumptions about trust between 
intimates aside, it is every man and woman for themselves in the world of 
private procreation. 
The focus of Professor Dov Fox’s recent essay, Reproductive 
Negligence, however, is not on conduct, intentional or otherwise, between 
intimates but on the negligent provision of reproductive services by 
medical professionals.4 Surprisingly—we are after all talking about the 
                                                                                                                           
* Barbara Aronstein Black Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For valuable 
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 1. See Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) (recognizing a cause of 
action for tortious transmittal of herpes “in line with the public policy of this state, which 
seeks to protect its citizens from infection by communicable diseases”). 
 2. See, e.g., L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y. 1983) (holding the 
conduct of the parents in causing a child’s conception to be irrelevant in determining 
child support obligations); A. Rachel Camp, Coercing Pregnancy, 21 Wm. & Mary J. 
Women & L. 275, 308 (2015) (noting the discrepancy between contraception, in which 
courts are reluctant to become involved, and other contexts in which unwanted things can 
happen and invite a legal claim for injury). 
 3. L. Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d at 716 (emphasis added). 
 4. Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 151–57 (2017). Like 
some private parties, professional infertility specialists have also intentionally interfered 
with a patient’s reproductive plans, as when doctors substitute their own sperm for that 
of anonymous donors, sometimes repeatedly, creating a phalanx of half-siblings. See 
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provision of medical care by doctors—we learn right off the bat that 
plaintiffs who suffer at the negligent hands of medical personnel from 
whom reproductive treatment has been purchased have no recourse in 
tort, except in the rarest of circumstances. 
Fox presents a comprehensive, well-structured, and most timely case 
that plaintiffs should indeed be able to receive damages for the harms 
suffered as a result of reproductive negligence. He powerfully argues for 
recognition of a new cause of action that establishes particular categories 
of reproductive harm—those involving neither physical injury nor finan-
cial loss—as compensable torts. Such recognition would enable judges 
and advocates to abandon the doctrinal gymnastics now used to shoe-
horn such claims under one or another existing tort in order to remedy 
what no one denies is a wrong.5 As Professor Karl Llewellyn said with 
regard to “shoehorning” by construction in contracts—to recognize, for 
example, unconscionable conduct—the difficulty with such techniques is 
that “since they do not face the issue, they fail to accumulate either 
experience or authority in the needed direction . . . . The net effect is 
unnecessary confusion and unpredictability . . . and evil persisting that 
calls for remedy.”6 
The new tort is not only just in its recognition of reproductive negli-
gence, but it is also increasingly necessary. As Fox explains, the harms of 
thwarted reproductive planning find no remedy in other traditional 
sources of legal accountability—contract, property, emotional distress, or 
regulatory schemes—yet people are increasingly using the new 
technologies to address reproductive difficulties or preferences.7 The law 
                                                                                                                           
Associated Press, Retired Fertility Doctor Accused of Impregnating Several Patients Pleads 
Not Guilty to Obstruction, L.A. Times (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/nationnow/la-na-fertility-doctor-20160912-snap-story.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (noting there were at least eight children that resulted from fifty 
inseminations in which a fertility doctor used his own sperm “instead of donated sperm his 
patients were expecting”); Christopher F. Schuetze, Dutch Fertility Doctor Swapped Donors’ 
Sperm with His, Lawsuit Claims, N.Y. Times (May 15, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/europe/dutch-fertility-doctor-swapped-
donors-sperm-with-his-lawsuit-claims.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting it 
is suspected that twelve children “were conceived using the clinic director’s sperm”); 
Rebecca Smith, British Man ‘Fathered 600 Children’ at Own Fertility Clinic, Telegraph 
(Apr. 8, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9193014/British-man-fathered-600-
children-at-own-fertility-clinic.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“A British man 
may have fathered 600 children by repeatedly using his own sperm in a fertility clinic he 
ran . . . .”). 
 5. Fox, supra note 4, at 154–55 (“Judges unwilling to dismiss such claims altogether 
have little success trying to shoehorn them into theories that are alternatively cramped 
(e.g., lost property, product liability), jarring (e.g., wrongful life, wrongful death), or dis-
ingenuous (e.g., intentional infliction of distress for mere accidents, breach without any 
warranty).” (footnotes omitted)). 
 6. K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703 (1939). 
 7. Fox, supra note 4, at 151, 162–76. Fox does not, however, give up on the possibili-
ties of recovery for emotional distress. As Professors Martha Chamallas and Jennifer 
Wriggins propose, where reproductive harms are concerned, a higher duty of care should 
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need not lag so far behind the demands of technology: The tort of 
reproductive negligence would be “uniquely equipped to meet emerging 
challenges about genetic modification that loom on the horizon.”8 In-
deed, since Fox’s essay was published in January of 2017, the horizon has 
gotten seriously closer. In August 2017, scientists for the first time suc-
cessfully edited out a mutant gene from a human embryo, producing a 
healthy embryo.9 The unfolding of gene-editing as well as more mun-
dane opportunities for procreative negligence—failing to properly clean 
a used pipette before using it for a subsequent insemination10—are on 
the legal system’s doorstep right now. Indeed, in The End of Sex and the 
Future of Human Reproduction, Professor Henry Greely announces his ex-
pectation that within the next twenty to forty years, the children of peo-
ple “with good health insurance” will be conceived not in bedrooms, but 
in clinics, as innovations in genetics and stem cell research will make 
embryo selection and implantation a common and irresistible procedure 
for human conception.11 This all sounds quite modern and new, 
expanding the possibilities for negligence in the realm of assisted con-
ception. We should remember, however, that reproductive negligence 
has been recognized for decades with regard to the frustrated procreative 
plans of parents who acquired their children not through intercourse or 
technology but through adoption. In such cases, adoption agencies have 
been held liable for negligence, most often in failing to give parents 
accurate information about the health, ancestry, or physical condition of 
the adoptive child.12 I put aside for now the question of whether 
                                                                                                                           
be imposed on doctors to elevate the emotional injuries stemming from reproductive 
harms and the harm to infants to the same status as property or physical damage. Martha 
Chamallas & Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law 
111 (2010). 
 8. Fox, supra note 4, at 241. 
 9. Pam Belluck, In Breakthrough, Scientists Edit a Dangerous Mutation from Genes 
in Human Embryos, N.Y. Times (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/ 
02/science/gene-editing-human-embryos.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 10. For instances in which this occurred, see Ilan Lior, Gay Israeli Couple Received 
Wrong Baby from Surrogate Mother in Nepal, Haaretz (Jan. 8, 2016), http:// 
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.696174 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); 
Marlise Simons, Uproar over Twins, and a Dutch Couple’s Anguish, N.Y. Times (June 
28, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/28/world/uproar-over-twins-and-a-dutch-
couple-s-anguish.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 11. Henry T. Greely, The End of Sex and the Future of Human Reproduction 1–2 
(2016). 
        12. See Wolford v. Children’s Home Soc’y of W. Va, 17 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1998) (“The wrong complained of in plaintiffs’ lawsuit lies not in the adoption 
itself, but in the alleged misconduct of the defendant . . . [which] plaintiffs claim infected 
the adoption process and caused compensable harm. . . . The plaintiffs’ claims are more 
properly characterized . . . as alleging a “wronged adoption.”); Roe v. Catholic Charities of 
the Diocese Springfield, 588 N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (recognizing “a cause of 
action for fraud based upon an adoption agency’s intentional misrepresentation of a 
child’s health and psychological background”); Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 
1112–14 (Mass. 1995) (recognizing a cause of action for “wrongful adoption”); M.H. v. 
32 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:29 
 
adoption is a form of procreation or something else. Yet the template of 
these cases neatly maps onto Fox’s tort of procreative negligence. 
In engaging with Fox’s essay, my plan is first to quickly set out his 
basic arguments, supplementing some of them with additional examples 
or tweaks along the way. Then, to satisfy my sense that more might be 
said or clarified, I shall take on three aspects of Fox’s analysis that give 
me pause. The first concerns how Fox frames the question of what is at 
stake; the second addresses distinctions among plaintiffs with regard to 
their experience of harm; and the third addresses the political setting in 
which reproductive harms now arise. My comments and critiques are of-
fered in the interest of making Fox’s persuasive case even more so 
(though perhaps not less problematic). 
I. FOX’S BASICS 
Under the new tort law, Fox organizes the procreative wrongs that 
stand to be righted into three categories: (1) the imposition of unwanted 
pregnancy or parenting through professional negligence (e.g., vitamins 
issued in place of birth control pills); (2) the deprivation of wanted preg-
nancy or parenting through professional negligence (e.g., fetal misdiag-
nosis leading to a pregnant woman’s decision to abort a wanted preg-
nancy); and (3) negligent conduct that thwarts choices parents have 
made about the characteristics of the baby they want.13 This third cate-
gory Fox calls the confounding of procreation, and it includes mistakes in 
sperm-sorting, gene-editing, and pre-implant genetic diagnoses.14 In sum, 
parents who respectively wanted no baby, a baby, and a special baby in-
stead received a baby, no baby, and the wrong kind of baby. The pro-
posed tort is capacious indeed, though each of these claims of harm pre-
sents distinctive challenges to the existing tort system. As Fox shows 
through the impressive compendium of case law he has assembled, 
recovery in tort is denied in each category.15 This is not because there is a 
problem with causation, as there was in the diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases 
of the 1980s, in which plaintiffs struggling with infertility were unsure 
which pharmaceutical company had manufactured the exact brand of 
DES pill ingested by their pregnant mothers a generation earlier.16 The 
problem Fox seeks to redress is rather that “our legal system does not 
                                                                                                                           
Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 1992) (requiring adoption agencies “to 
use due care . . . when they undertake to disclose information about a child’s genetic 
parents and medical history”); Mallette v. Children’s Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 
1995) (noting many states impose a duty of care on adoption agencies when providing 
parents with information). 
 13. Fox, supra note 4, at 153. 
 14. Id. at 200–01. 
 15. Id. at 153–54. 
 16. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980). Although the DES 
cases involved goods, liability puzzles are also likely to arise with regard to services in our 
ongoing “complex industrial society.” Id. at 936. 
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recognize a conception of injury that accommodates the disruption of 
reproductive plans.”17 
How can this be? We seem to be an enthusiastically pro-natalist 
country, or, in Professor Katherine Franke’s words, we are a country satu-
rated in “repronormativity.”18 The Supreme Court has made clear that 
states may try to persuade pregnant women to choose childbirth over 
abortion,19 and a fair number of states have taken them up on the invita-
tion.20 Under the Trump Administration, the “culture of life” introduced 
into American politics by President Ronald Reagan is making an official 
comeback with its renewed commitment to abstinence over 
contraception education.21 Our jurisprudence has long recognized the 
protection of procreative practices and abilities as fundamental to our 
core social values, notwithstanding the sterilizations of the institu-
tionalized Carrie Buck in the 1920s22 and of poor, black women into the 
1970s without their consent.23 Still, by the 1940s, the Court had begun to 
come around. Jack Skinner could not be castrated as punishment for 
stealing chickens; to do so would deprive him on equal protection 
grounds (embezzlers just did jail time) of “the right to have offspring,” 
which the Court announced as “one of the basic civil rights of man.”24 
                                                                                                                           
 17. Fox, supra note 4, at 153. 
 18. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 
101 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 183 (2001). 
 19. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (“Unless it has 
that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose 
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.”). 
 20. See What Anti-Choice Measures Are in Place in Your State?, NARAL Pro-Choice 
Am., http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/laws-policy/state-government/ [http://perma.cc/ 
4V9T-YZ2B] (last visited Aug. 14, 2017) (highlighting, using an interactive map, each 
state’s relative position on reproductive rights). 
 21. See Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation 15, 18 (1984) 
(arguing no legislative majority had voted for “abortion-on-demand” and that many 
Americans were saddened by the ruling in Roe v. Wade); Pam Belluck, Programs that Fight 
Teenage Pregnancy Are at Risk of Being Cut, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/health/teen-pregnancy-prevention-trump-budget-
cuts.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the Trump Administration’s 
plan to eliminate funding for certain pregnancy-prevention programs that could effec-
tively “end the Obama-era effort to shift away from decades of reliance on abstinence-only 
programs”); see also Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of 
Life, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 800–08 (2006) (discussing the “culture of life” and its 
origins). 
 22. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough.”). 
 23. Up until the 1970s, forced sterilizations were not deemed offensive to a rea-
sonable person’s sense of dignity because they were performed on impoverished black 
women who already had children. Chamallas & Wriggins, supra note 7, at 105–06. 
 24. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942). See 
generally Victoria F. Nourse, In Reckless Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near 
Triumph of American Eugenics 59–60 (2008) (discussing various rationales behind the 
practice of sterilizing inmates). 
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Against this most-serious-sounding constitutional support, it would seem 
that the tort of reproductive negligence is but a servant of public values. 
It is right and logical to encourage and protect procreative endeavors by 
granting people a civil remedy when their reproductive plans go wrong 
at the negligent hands of a medical professional. 
Fox’s proposed tort has been carefully thought out. The section on 
damages, for example, is alert not only to hostility by judges, legislatures, 
and the public regarding runaway verdicts25 but also to the integrity of 
tort law itself as it attempts to balance public interests against private 
harm. Damages awards are to “operate as a function of: (1) the severity 
of injury to interests in the legitimate expectation of exercising control of 
pregnancy, parenthood, or selection of offspring particulars; and (2) the 
probability that such injuries were caused by deficient care rather than 
other factors.”26 Here I want to provide two contextual points that push 
on Fox’s commitment to the loss of control as key to the injury suffered. 
First, people have differing expectations about exercising control over 
reproduction. For example, infertility is not always regarded as “being 
robbed of the ability to determine the conditions under which to 
procreate.”27 I have in mind the role of religion, which we see at work 
historically and into the present. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, women “would not have considered seeking medical attention 
for their inability to conceive; doing so may have been viewed as defying 
the Lord.”28 Even today, when medical intervention is possible, faith still 
influences decisions by some infertile women to engage with artificial 
reproductive technologies, and religion may also play a role when such 
technologies fail. For example, in her small but suggestive study of 
infertile religious women, sociologist Patricia Jennings uncovered the 
importance of religious doctrine to women considering the use of 
artificial reproductive technologies (ARTs), the use of a surrogate, and 
the possibility of adoption.29 Some of these women accepted on faith that 
God may have had “something else in mind” for them.30 
                                                                                                                           
 25. See, e.g., Hot Coffee (HBO June 27, 2011) (detailing how the infamous legal 
battle over a cup of hot coffee from McDonald’s led a push for tort reform). 
 26. Fox, supra note 4, at 212. 
 27. Id. at 155. The vocabulary leads to another wrinkle: Some infertile women view 
their infertility as “robbing their own mothers of the chance to bond with them through a 
shared experience of pregnancy and childbirth.” Patricia K. Jennings, “God Had 
Something Else in Mind”: Family, Religion and Infertility, 39 J. Contemp. Ethnography 
215, 223 (2010). The intergenerational connection raises a question of what we might 
think of as “procreative bystander liability,” which here would seem to be a stretch. 
 28. Sarah Rodriguez, Placing the History of Oncofertility, in Oncofertility: Ethical, 
Legal, Social, and Medical Perspectives 103, 105 (Teresa K. Woodruff et al. eds., 2010). 
See generally Margaret Marsh & Wanda Ronner, The Empty Cradle: Infertility in America 
from Colonial Times to the Present (1996) (exploring the medical and cultural notions, 
including religious beliefs, and misconceptions surrounding infertility). 
 29. Jennings, supra note 26, at 215. 
 30. Id. at 232. 
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Second, in calculating damages for a pregnancy that didn’t happen 
due to negligence, is the loss for the pregnancy itself or for the eventual 
child? The question provokes interrogation over how much a woman 
takes satisfaction or pleasure in gestation itself. And if compensation is 
about the loss of the child, a different problem arises. As Professors 
Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins have pointed out, race- and 
gender-based actuarial charts “are of particular importance in cases 
involving severe injuries to persons who have not yet established an 
individual track record of employment and earnings, notably children.”31 
The implications of this for persons using ARTs may be less than in other 
types of catastrophes, when the risk of loss may be spread more evenly 
across demographic categories. Nonetheless, because pregnancy loss is 
such a deeply personal and penetrating loss, reproductive negligence 
cases reveal an equality of suffering among parents that actuarial tables 
necessarily abandon, as some parents might find themselves receiving 
less in compensation for a girl or nonwhite child than for a white boy.32 
Before moving ahead, there is a small point I was initially reluctant 
to make, but I come in friendship. Professor Fox’s essay makes an 
important, much needed contribution to the scholarly fields of 
reproduction and tort law. It is new in the comprehensiveness of its reach 
and in its conceptual framing (some of which I will quarrel with later). 
Yet I think it unnecessary for so fine a scholar as Fox to claim that he is 
the first to think this all up, when in the very same sentence he acknowl-
edges “two prescient law students” and a recent grad writing ten years 
ago had done something similar.33 I mention this because it seems few 
scholarly papers these days, especially by junior scholars, fail to announce 
themselves as the first to have thought the subject up. This is a plea, I 
think, to hiring committees and to the law reviews not to require or ex-
pect such declarations when evaluating a candidate or accepting a piece. 
This takes nothing away from the originality of the author’s own contri-
bution but simply acknowledges that most of us are indebted to others, 
who may have individually or collectively provided the insightful 
sentence or example that led to our particular spark. 
II. THREE CONCERNS 
I want now to draw attention to three aspects of Fox’s analysis that 
have given me pause. I write not from the perspective of a torts specialist 
but as someone who spends time in the weeds of reproduction from a 
sociolegal point of view. Both reproduction and torts are touchy matters. 
                                                                                                                           
 31. Chamallas & Wriggins, supra note 7, at 159. 
 32. Cf. Kim Soffen, In One Corner of the Law, Minorities and Women Are Often 
Valued Less, Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Oct. 25, 2006) http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/business/wonk/settlements/ [http://perma.cc/N2MN-DD3U] (discussing how 
juries may award less compensatory damages for victims that are minority or female). 
 33. Fox, supra note 4, at 156.  
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Trying to remedy wrongs (infertility, for example) that some would re-
gard as God’s will in a legal field that others think shouldn’t exist (New 
Zealand abandoned personal injury torts in 197434) or that others think 
should be stringently regulated by statehouses (enactment of damage 
caps across the United States35) isn’t going to be easy. 
So to my concerns. The first is Fox’s framing of what is at stake for 
plaintiffs with regard to the bundle of reproductive wrongs he has identi-
fied. The second concerns the differences between men and women with 
regard to the procreative harm suffered. My third concern is that, as Fox 
acknowledges, it is easy to come up with constitutional phrases recogniz-
ing the importance of procreation to individuals and thus the doctrinal 
expansion of causes of actions protecting those interests. Yet the story is 
not only constitutional or doctrinal but deeply political as well. In the 
bitter wars concerning abortion, any issue that touches upon reproduc-
tion is fraught with political consequence. As we shall see, there are con-
nections among my three concerns: framing, gender, and politics. These 
connections are sometimes pursued quietly; increasingly, they are 
pursued boldly and explicitly. 
A.    Framing 
At the center of any tort is the necessary element of harm. Yet Fox’s 
framing of what the harm has been does not ring entirely true to me. My 
problem is with Fox’s determination that in each of the three areas he 
treats—imposing procreation, denying it, or confounding particular 
desires regarding the child’s make-up—the nature of the harm that 
results from the negligence is the disruption to an individual’s procrea-
tive plans. I want to suggest it is not the loss of control over planning but 
rather the loss of what the plan meant to produce. 
Fox formulates the nature of the harm as “the disruption of family 
planning,”36 frustrating “the control individuals have over their 
reproductive lives,”37 and the loss of “people’s legitimate expectations to 
exercise a reasonable measure of control over decisions about having 
children.”38 Damages are intended to compensate those who have been 
robbed “of their legitimate expectations of control over whether, when, 
and how to undertake the life roles of pregnancy and parenthood.”39 
While each of the three specific procreative frustrations—imposing, 
                                                                                                                           
 34. Geoffrey Palmer, New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years 
On, 44 U. Toronto L. J. 223, 223 (1994). 
 35. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice 
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 391, 396–415 (2005); see also Ctr. for Justice & 
Democracy, Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary 2 (2017) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
 36. Fox, supra note 4, at 172. 
 37. Id. at 159. 
 38. Id. at 210–11. 
 39. Id. at 167. 
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denying, or confounding reproductive plans—has distinctive particulars 
in terms of exactly what isn’t achieved, the “whether, when, and how” 
makes clear that the essence of the harm—the failure of control over the 
outcome of reasonable procreative expectations—applies to all three 
procreative frustrations. Thus the focus is on the loss of procreative 
control rather than the loss of the hoped-for outcome. That at least is 
Fox’s contention. I am not entirely clear, however, why “control over” is 
the key. I see that it offers a unifying interest among the three wrongs at 
issue, since the outcome approach is so different in each. Control ho-
mogenizes procreative desires by roping them together with regard to 
the overarching motivation, and it satisfies Fox’s desire to find a right at 
the core of the tort. 
Fox says that “[l]egal protection of these legitimate expectations of 
competent care in matters of procreation marks the next frontier of re-
productive freedom.”40 But expectations are always difficult to recover 
when medical services are at stake.41 And I am not sure that control does 
us much better. Is this simply a way to avoid the malpractice requirement 
of physical injury? Is it an attempt to make the basis of liability more con-
crete, more objective? Or is it an attempt to connect the proposal for this 
new tort to the idea of autonomy, in the sense of vindicating a person’s 
self-authorship of his or her life?42 Since this idea is already vindicated in 
the abortion jurisprudence,43 perhaps Fox thinks it might be made the 
key in this area too. Might another approach, perhaps running in paral-
lel, be to focus on the unique emotional harms of disappointed expecta-
tions with regard to offspring? Or, in the wrong-embryo-implanted cases, 
to focus on pregnancy itself as injury, as Professor Khiara Bridges has 
observed legislatures have done in the context of rape.44 
What concerns me is that these formulations focus not on the disap-
pointing outcome or on disappointment about the outcome but on the 
loss of control over the disappointing outcome. In this way, they place 
control, or choice, at center-stage. Early in his essay, Fox rightly cele-
brates the fact that evolving reproductive technologies have 
“transfer[red] the reins of control over procreation from chance to 
choice.”45 This is unquestionably a good thing in terms of individual au-
tonomy. But as pro-choice supporters have learned too well, we are not a 
country so fond of choice when it comes to all aspects of reproduction, 
or of rewarding the loss of control over disrupted plans when the plan 
                                                                                                                           
 40. Id. at 161. 
 41. Id. at 126. 
 42. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 204 (1986) (“An autonomous person is 
part author of his own life. His life is, in part, of his own making.”). 
 43. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860–61 (1992) (discussing 
how women’s autonomy to make reproductive decision underpins Roe v. Wade). 
 44. Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture, 65 
Stan. L. Rev. 457, 457–58 (2013). 
 45. Fox, supra note 4, at 160. 
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was to terminate a pregnancy if pertinent facts had been accurately 
known. Control over reproductive plans is couched in the same rhetori-
cal disadvantage that marks the very concept of reproductive choice and 
the attributed connotations of consumerism and self-satisfaction. Would 
there be a tort for a woman who, because of her doctor’s negligence, de-
livers a healthy baby through a caesarian section rather than by her pre-
ferred method of a vaginal birth? There is no question that many women 
favor the latter form of birth as being more natural and participatory, 
and that they suffer psychologically when they are not able to proceed in 
that way.46 Interestingly, in the attempt to reform Obamacare during the 
spring of 2017, the argument was raised that the stigma attached to C-
sections is increased by designating them as “pre-existing conditions” 
and so outside the scope of insurance.47 
Moreover, aside from the political challenge of identifying control, I 
am suspicious of the claim that control is really at the heart of the matter. 
I think disappointed plaintiffs as a factual matter are distressed that they 
didn’t get what they bargained and paid for—competent medical 
treatment—toward a reproductive goal. To veer back toward contracts, 
they wanted their expectations to be met with regard to the quality of 
medical care. 
Focusing on control over plans seems an unsympathetic strategy, in 
part because I am not sure it gets at what I can only call the spectral 
tangibleness regarding what is lost. Of course, disrupted planning has its 
own intrinsic problems: It is too close to abortion rhetoric. But the prob-
lem is deeper. Planning procreation has never been a surefire enterprise. 
People try, they wait, they consider adoption, they try some more. The 
focus on planning may reflect a generational difference. Today women 
under thirty-five are told to see a doctor if one year of unprotected 
intercourse has not resulted in a pregnancy.48 The Centers for Disease 
Control recommends women over thirty-five see a doctor after six 
months of unsuccessful intercourse.49 In the past, the period before 
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suggesting someone was infertile was longer.50 Perhaps this is because in 
the past there were fewer treatments for infertility and so the medical 
profession had little to offer. It is also the case that the age of women 
when they have their first child has risen,51 so that more women are likely 
to have entered the zone of concern because they are actively seeking 
pregnancy later in their life span. I wonder as well if there is a 
millennial—or more likely a Gen X—expectation of control over other 
things as well, connected in part to a faith in technology and invention. I 
put these questions to Professor Fox, in order to understand why 
disrupted plans, in contrast to procreation denied, is at the heart of the 
tort. 
There is one other factual aspect regarding loss of control I want to 
mention. This is that sometimes loss of control becomes acceptance. I do 
not mean acceptance because there is no remedy and there is nothing 
left to do. I mean acceptance because, focusing on procreation 
confounded for a moment, parenting is a strange business. In Far from the 
Tree, Andrew Solomon studies 300 families whose children fell “far from 
the tree” in terms of characteristics, abilities, looks, behavior, and yet 
who accepted them.52 This is not to say that if the distance between 
parent and child was the result of negligence, the parent might not have 
sued for the costs of raising the child. And certainly not all parents are 
resilient enough to manage a child that was beyond their expectations or 
their own abilities. But Solomon summarizes his case thus: “[A]cceptance 
reaches its apogee when parents conclude that while they supposed that 
they were pinioned by a great and catastrophic loss of hope, they were in 
fact falling in love with someone they didn’t yet know enough to want.”53 
To some, this may sound either too sugary or too noble. But after 
reading Solomon’s account of parents whose children had autism or 
Down’s Syndrome, were criminals, dwarfs, prodigies, or gay, it didn’t 
seem noble. Nor did it seem to have anything to do with law. 
B.    Gendered Harms 
As part of his framing, Professor Fox talks about his reproductively 
wronged plaintiffs as persons and people, rather than as men and 
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women. I can see reasons for doing this. The gender neutral phrase 
“nonpregnant persons” as used in Geduldig v. Aiello54 to explain why unfa-
vorable treatment on account of pregnancy was not sex discrimination 
was once a matter of general mirth among feminist scholars. At present, 
the phrase is now understood to recognize the procreative capacities of 
transmen, and so it accurately reflects an aspect of modern reproductive 
realities. The language of gender neutrality also encompasses what is 
sometimes called “structural infertility,” a term used to describe the ina-
bility of same-sex couples to have biological children together.55 The fact 
remains, however, that many men and women experience procreation 
disruptions differently, as Fox briefly acknowledges: “The exercise of 
control over decisions about whether or not to carry a child matters a 
great deal to women, and to a lesser extent to their partners.”56 But the 
issue is too crucial to the nature of the harm at issue to leave the matter 
quite so undeveloped. Some sense of the differences needs to be taken 
into account directly and more vigorously into account in a discussion 
like this. 
The point is not that men suffer no disappointment at losing control 
over reproductive plans, to use Fox’s formulation about what is at stake. 
But we know that in each of the three circumstances that comprise re-
productive negligence, the measure of disappointment is not gender 
neutral. For example, with regard to fertility, women “experience greater 
amounts of infertility-related stress” and are “more likely than men to 
report depression and anxiety symptoms, take a more active role in med-
ical treatment, and respond more poorly following treatment failure.”57 
Perhaps these distinctions mean only that women plaintiffs will have 
an easier time making their case. But we are not at that stage yet. We are 
still trying to get the cause of action, not implement it. In terms of per-
suading a legislature or court, the power of a gendered claim might help 
to sharpen the nature of what was at stake for either progenitor, even if 
in the end the formulation is gender neutral. Consider that other torts 
such as sexual harassment arose because of the reframing of gendered 
misconduct through examples highlighting the nonsense of categorizing 
gender-based bullying as “workplace flirtations” or “boys will be boys.” 
(And certainly boys did their fair share of sexually harassing boys.58) 
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To understand the harm as gendered, and focusing for a minute on 
procreation denied, we might want to know why procreation is sought. 
Fox touches on this, but I want to say more about what is at stake when 
motherhood is denied by looking at why women seek it in the first place. 
Some reasons we glean from participant observation or from the lives of 
others around us. As I have noted elsewhere, women have children “to 
keep a marriage together, to meet social, spousal, or parental expecta-
tions, to experience pregnancy, or to pass on the family name, genes, or 
silver.”59 In more academic terms, as Canadian sociologist Jean Veevers 
explained nearly forty years ago, in a pro-natalist society, these motiva-
tions also encompass moral and civic obligations, marital and sexual suc-
cess, personal maturity, and normality.60 And too, some women seek 
motherhood because they love children in general, or at least they love 
the idea of children and all that having one’s own baby is thought to 
portend.61 
Of course, these factors play out differently for differently situated 
women and girls who must work with what they have. Consider the cir-
cumstances of some teenagers. In her ever powerful and insightful piece 
Sapphire Bound!, Regina Austin explained, “Teenage pregnancy is a prod-
uct of the teens’ contradictory pursuit of romance, security, status, 
freedom, and responsibility within the confines of their immediate 
surroundings.”62 Motherhood may not always produce the magical 
results that were hoped for—commitment from a sexual partner, a baby 
who coos more than it cries—but this kind of awakening is true for many 
new mothers. In her 1978 study of why women chose abortion, Kristen 
Luker found that her subjects—Bay Area women in their twenties 
seeking abortion—had decided to “take their chances” by deliberately 
having sex without contraception on the thought that a pregnancy might 
induce a stronger commitment (or even proposal) from their partner.63 
If that plan fizzled, legal abortion was available as a back-up.64 Luker’s 
risk-taking, commitment-seeking cohort aside, we see how very much can 
be lost. 
This is true for men as well as women. As Gay Becker states, infertil-
ity is often experienced “as an assault on gender identity.”65 Some men 
suffer the loss of what is sometimes understood as the essence of 
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masculinity, as potency gets confused with virility. Male-factor infertility 
profoundly affects a man’s sense of self, drawing not only from his 
physiological failure to father but also from his inability to solve his wife’s 
desire for a child. Complicated negotiations sometimes follow, as wives 
will “cover” for their husband’s infertility in exchange for the husband’s 
agreement to accept artificial insemination or adoption as a cure.66 All of 
this suggests, certainly in the context of infertility treatment, that the 
emotional trade-offs and costs are in play even before we get to any re-
productive negligence, which one imagines intensifies the suffering of 
the couple. Professional carelessness may well compound the gendered 
turmoil that steered the couple—each of them individually or as a mari-
tal unit—to medical intervention in the first place. The harms that 
reproductive negligence add to the emotional fragility wrought by infer-
tility are difficult to unpack, but they remind us how much is at stake 
when troubled procreation is additionally and unnecessarily thwarted. 
Why then have the harms of reproductive negligence gone unrec-
ognized? One factor is the secrecy that has long accompanied pregnancy 
loss in any form: miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion. For women, failure 
to produce offspring, whether involuntarily or deliberately, has been a 
marker of failure as a woman. We see this historically in the May 22, 1910 
announcement in the New York Times that “Queen Victoria [of Spain] 
was delivered of an infant Prince stillborn at 4 o’clock this morning. . . . 
The body will be buried without ceremony in the royal pantheon of the 
Escurial Monastery. When told of her loss the mother wept . . . .”67 The 
Queen’s loss was noted, but the absence of ceremony served to lessen 
attention to the shame of it—shame not simply as disappointment, but 
shame as failure, sometimes of dynastic proportions. 
Shame and secrecy also attach to infertility and to infertility treat-
ment. Consider the case of Mr. and Mrs. G whose healthy triplets re-
sulted from the Gs’ participation in an in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
program at the Jewish Hospital of St. Louis. When a local television 
station showed a human-interest program showing the Gs, among others, 
attending an IVF “class reunion” sometime later, the Gs sued for 
invasion of privacy.68 As background, recall that tort law requires that for 
the unbidden disclosure of personal information to be actionable, the 
disclosure must be such “that a reasonable person would feel justified in 
feeling seriously aggrieved by it.”69 And, while how a reasonable person 
would respond to any particular disclosure is a matter for a jury to 
decide, revelations in the areas of sex, medicine, and reproduction are 
commonly accepted as cause for a person to be seriously aggrieved. Thus, 
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in the Y.G. case, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s pretrial 
dismissal of the Gs’ claim.70 In doing so, the appellate court broadcast 
the very kinds of information the Gs had dreaded in the first place, 
speculating as it did in voyeuristic detail about the couple’s “bodily 
procreative secrets” and noting that recourse to an IVF program might 
indicate “the physical problems which exist with the couple’s 
reproductive systems or that they are incapable of performing sexually.”71 
Mr. and Mrs. G may have prevailed in their tort suit, but at the price of 
judicial (and public) speculation about their bodies and sex lives. Fox 
rightly notes that this sort of stigma may keep many instances of 
reproductive negligence “in the shadows” so that cases are not brought 
in the first place.72 
The same dynamic has been true for miscarriage and, of course, for 
abortion. Linda Layne has chronicled how until the last twenty or so 
years, women who experienced miscarriages stayed utterly mum on the 
subject, never imagining that the same loss is experienced in some seven-
teen percent of all pregnancies, surely including some of those in one’s 
own family or among colleagues and friends.73 Until very recently, the 
silence around abortion has been similarly deafening, a burden women 
endure for the sake of their reputations, relationships, and safety. 
Mothers do not tell their daughters, friends keep it quiet from friends, 
and women often go out of town to a physician who does not know 
them.74 For but one tort-related example of the consequences of 
publicity about a woman’s abortion history, consider Garcia v. Providence 
Medical Center.75 In that case, Mrs. Garcia brought a malpractice claim 
against a hospital seeking damages for emotional distress following the 
death of her infant son while in its care.76 After permitting the defendant 
to introduce evidence that Mrs. Garcia had had three abortions in the 
years before her son’s birth, the trial court ultimately ruled against her.77 
Mrs. Garcia appealed on the ground that evidence of her prior abortions 
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should have been excluded.78 The Washington State Court of Appeals 
agreed with her, noting that the hospital’s claim rested on the implicit 
assumption “that if a woman has voluntarily consented to an abortion, 
she is less affected by the pain of the loss of a child than a woman who 
never voluntarily terminated a pregnancy.”79 A new trial was ordered.80 
The point here is that without more open discussion, the loss 
experienced from a miscarriage, or a stillbirth, or the abortion of a 
wanted pregnancy rarely registers as harm as a matter of social fact.81 It is 
instead an embarrassment or loss to be endured privately. Without richer 
and more public accounts of pregnancy loss, there is insufficient cultural 
familiarity to figure the loss as a legal harm. 
All this may seem peculiar because, in other contexts, tort law has 
gone out of its way to recognize the costs to a mother of losing a born 
child. In Dillon v. Legg, the California Supreme Court extended recovery 
to a mother who had witnessed her four-year-old daughter being struck 
dead by a negligent driver as the girl crossed the street to get home.82 
The general rule is that mere bystanders cannot recover damages absent 
physical injury to themselves.83 Mrs. Dillon challenged the rule in her 
opening brief: “Could anyone be so callous, so naïve, so devoid of human 
experience not to understand the anguish that would result” when a 
mother sees her child from a safe distance mangled under an approach-
ing car?84 In the Dillon case, the court rethought the proposition in the 
context of motherhood, holding that not to permit recovery would “frus-
trat[e] . . . the natural justice upon which the mother’s claim rests.”85 
Here, Fox might attend to yet another category of gendered repro-
ductive negligence that has also been neglected in torts. These are the 
harms wrought against what Professor Jamie Abrams has identified as the 
“birthing woman,” a transitional stage of reproductive activity distinct 
from either pregnancy or parenthood.86 Abrams observes that histori-
cally, birthing women often expected to die during labor and rarely sued 
for physical harms that resulted from obstetric malpractice.87 More 
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recently, the fetus has become the primary patient in labor, similarly 
obscuring women’s harms and their convictions about claiming them.88 
C.    The Politics of Abortion 
Reproduction and the desires and practices that accompany acquir-
ing children in the United States are not politically neutral issues. We 
are, and have been for nearly fifty years, in near manic agitation over 
abortion, the jewel in the political crown (from all directions). Moreover, 
the jewel is surrounded by a filigree of connected concerns about 
contraception, infertility, and sex. None of this is politically innocent. To 
focus just on abortion, we see that abortion suddenly seems to be about 
everything, and everything can quickly come to be about abortion.89 
Among the issues that may get swept into this maelstrom, or at least 
tainted by it, are Fox’s efforts to compensate plaintiffs whose suffering 
included getting a child when none was desired, or getting the wrong 
kind of child when its sought-after particulars were negligently thwarted. 
To see how the reach of political commitment in opposition to basic 
reproductive rights has already influenced lawmaking, I close this 
Response with three legislative examples. To warm us up, the first is a 
tort example addressed by Professor Fox: wrongful birth. Just to review, 
here is how a Rhode Island court explained denying recovery in a 
wrongful birth suit: 
Make no mistake. These cases are not about birth, or 
wrongfulness, or negligence, or common law. They are about 
abortion. . . . For those who cannot accept the premise [that 
abortion is a legal choice for a woman], no one should ever be 
compensated for injury just because the choice of abortion has 
been thwarted.90 
Pennsylvania was equally clear in abolishing its wrongful birth ac-
tion.91 The debate on the floor of the House was heated, as a pro-life 
legislator accused a supporter of the cause of action for having a “twisted 
sense of morality” that protects “those who would take the lives of the 
innocent . . . [while advocating that] it is more cruel to prevent an abor-
tion than it is to kill an unborn baby.”92  
My second example comes from the law of vital statistics and the 
seemingly remote matter of documentation surrounding stillborn deaths. 
At least thirty-four states have enacted legislation known generally as 
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“Missing Angel Acts.”93 These are laws that authorize parents to request, 
and require the state to provide, a birth certificate for a stillborn child. 
The statutes were enacted in response to lobbying efforts by bereaved 
parents dissatisfied with the issuance of a stillborn death certificate, once 
the only official document that marked such deaths. The parents force-
fully argued that a stillborn death certificate failed to capture the true 
nature of their loss—the loss to a parent of a child.94 As these bills 
worked themselves through statehouses across the country, supporters of 
legal abortion registered their concern that granting birth certificates to 
children who had never lived might serve as yet another step in the 
ongoing legal process of equating prenatal life and life of born persons, 
and that this equation might, sooner or later, play its part in the 
recriminalization of abortion.95 Drafting compromises in the text of the 
Missing Angel Acts were reached: The certificates were made available 
only upon the request of a parent, and abortions were explicitly excluded 
from their coverage.96 At the same time, demonstrating that recognition 
of prenatal life can take on a life of its own, three states went further and 
granted dependent tax exemptions to the stillborn’s parents in the year 
of the birth.97 My point here is not to disparage official efforts to make 
the lives of grieving parents easier, but rather to observe that abortion 
politics have an uncanny habit of shimmying into law in unexpected 
places, such as birth certificates. Similarly, tort reforms that might 
otherwise extend notions of liability for reproductive negligence may be 
seen as dangerous or unacceptable because of their explicit recognition 
that not all children are wanted and that people will take steps to prevent 
their births. 
My final example directly engages the issue of control over plans for 
the shape of one’s future that Professor Fox sets at the heart of the tort 
of reproductive negligence: advance directives or “living wills.” This form 
of legislatively sanctioned control connects not to birth but to death and 
dying. Advanced directives are understood generally to be a positive 
move, enhancing a person’s free will until the very end. Yet in recent 
years, more than half of states have enacted legislation denying effect to 
advance directives in cases in which the patient is pregnant at the time 
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the directive would otherwise spring into effect.98 For example, the 
Minnesota statute states that “[i]n the case of a living will of a patient 
that the attending physician knows is pregnant, the living will must not 
be given effect as long as it is possible that the fetus could develop to the 
point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treat-
ment.”99 Michigan’s legislation provides that “[t]his . . . designation can-
not be used to make a medical treatment decision to withhold or with-
draw treatment from a patient who is pregnant that would result in the 
pregnant patient’s death.”100 
The example shows how the state’s interest in ongoing prenatal life 
can override the desired control over end-of-life issues as arranged by a 
patient who is pregnant at the later point in time when the directive 
would come into play. Yet her wishes may not be only for her own death; 
she may have also taken into consideration her assessment of what was 
best for her child to be. No matter. The statutes deny effect and disrupt 
the stated wishes and plans of a competent adult. Advocates who oppose 
Fox’s clarification and explanation of procreative negligence may find 
support in the pregnancy provisos that now limit the force of advance 
directives. Greater attention to the politics in which doctrine must neces-
sarily develop may clarify where atmospheric pitfalls lie for Fox’s 
argument. 
CONCLUSION 
There is of course a division of labor with regard to all scholarly 
work. If—shall we say when?—the tort under discussion comes into be-
ing, it will have been on account of the work of scholars, advocates, 
jurists, and those plaintiffs willing to put it all out there. Reproductive 
Negligence has taken us quite far into the process. I expect that in his 
forthcoming book, Birth Rights and Wrongs,101 Fox’s materials will find 
more room to breathe so that he can make the case in greater detail and 
with even greater consequence. 
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